

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 72 0415



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 15 April 1972*

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.







*For the President Only*

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# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month

JANUARY 1972 — APRIL 1972  
Weekly data as reported




## US BATTLE DEATHS

increased to 13 from the 12 of last week.




## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

decreased from last week's 680 to 579. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




## INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

include one regular, 12 special purpose, and 5 "gap-fill" groups totaling 3,096 personnel. The infiltration estimate for Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 is now some 110,500-112,500.




## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

reliable data unavailable.




## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

rose to 6,584 from last week's 2,987. This figure because of the fluid situation must be regarded as preliminary.



## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

reliable data unavailable.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity throughout South Vietnam remained at high levels during the week, though the pace of fighting was somewhat lower than in the initial stages of the current Communist offensive. In northern Military Region (MR) 1, ARVN forces are holding their own and in some areas have even seized the initiative. In the coastal lowlands of MR 1 and northern MR 2, however, the enemy's main and local forces have both become more aggressive in recent days, and have overrun one district headquarters town in northern Binh Dinh Province. In the central highlands of MR 2, the Communists on 14 April took Fire Support Base CHARLIE after heavy fighting. Thereafter, fighting slackened off in this area but picked up in the remainder of MR 2 as the NVA attempted to tie down Allied forces and interdict lines of communications to prevent re-supply and reinforcement of the highlands. The level of combat has also dropped at least temporarily around An Loc in GVN MR 3, but more action seems to be in the offing for this provincial capital as additional enemy forces move into the area. Enemy activity has remained at fairly high levels in MR 4, but has consisted primarily of interdiction of lines of communication and attacks against isolated outposts. So far, at least, the Communists have not been able to hit major population centers in the Delta. Evidence is beginning to mount that in rural areas of the Delta, the lowlands of MR's 1 and 2, and in certain other parts of rural South Vietnam, the enemy offensive has already dealt a significant setback to the pacification program. The permanence of this setback and its long term impact, however, will depend on whether the enemy's main force military operations are successful.

The situation in north Laos remains essentially unchanged, with friendly forces holding all but three of the helicopter pads on Skyline Ridge overlooking Long Tieng valley. The deteriorating weather of this transitional period between monsoons is increasingly becoming a factor in military operations. The weather cuts both ways -- friendly air operations are being hampered and enemy logistics movements are running into difficulties caused by rain damaged roadways. Farther north, the airport near the Royal Capital of Luang Prabang was rocketed on one occasion during the week. In the extreme northwest, the Chinese Communist road to Pak Beng has been extended another seven kilometers and the route will probably be motorable all the way to that Mekong town before the rains begin in earnest next month. In south Laos, enemy activity has diminished both in the central and southern Panhandle arenas.

In Cambodia, enemy-initiated activity during the week has been at a relatively low level. The enemy continues to put heavy pressure on the ARVN at Kompong Trach, however, and he carried out a 50-round rocket attack in the western and southwestern environs of Phnom Penh. Despite many reports of increased infiltration and logistic build-up on the outer periphery of the Phnom Penh Special Military Region, the situation around the capital in general remains quiet. Cambodian Army clearing operations to the west and northwest of the city have not met any serious opposition and they have not uncovered any major caches of enemy supplies.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The acceptance of 3,096 personnel during the week brings the estimate of NVA infiltrators destined for Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 to some 110,500 - 112,500. Communications intercepts of enemy logistics activity in the Laos Panhandle this past week indicate that a major enemy supply effort is under way in the area in support of the current offensive in South Vietnam. Intercepted messages also reveal, however, that shortages of certain supplies and deteriorating weather conditions have caused several enemy logistics elements virtually to shut down operations, at least for brief periods of time.

Communist Developments

Hanoi has issued a stream of invective against the intensified U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam. The high point to date has been a 16 April joint Lao Dong Party Central Committee-DRV Government appeal which, in addition to denouncing the "savage" air attacks, called on the Party, army and people to struggle resolutely for the cause of liberating the South. The appeal also called on the American people to stop the Nixon administration's "acts of war escalation."

As far as their own offensive in the South is concerned, the Communists' propaganda machine is exhorting their army and people onward to "total victory," and is emphasizing that the war is in "a very important phase." Nevertheless, Communist comment at this stage is somewhat more restrained than it was during the 1968 Tet offensive. Claims are not being made, for instance, as they were in Communist media accounts in early February 1968, that immediate and total victory is now at hand. Nor has the enemy issued public proclamations -- as he did at the beginning of the Tet 1968 offensive -- calling for an immediate mass "general uprising" by the people of South Vietnam. In effect, while the Communists have gone out on a propaganda limb in the current offensive, they are not as far out on it as they were in 1968.

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